Abstract-Current standards for vehicle safety consider only accidental failures; they do not consider failures caused by malicious attackers. The standards implicitly assume that the sensors and Electronic Control Units (ECUs) of each vehicle compose a secure in-vehicle network because no external entity communicates with the nodes of the network. These standards assume that safety and security aspects are independent.
I. INTRODUCTION
Each (motor) vehicle uses a network, called in-vehicle network, of sensors and Electronic Control Units (ECUs), which collect data about the vehicle's behavior and environment, control the functionalities of the vehicle, and collaborate by exchanging messages. Figure 1 depicts the architecture of an in-vehicle network (a.k.a. on-Board network). Nowadays, vehicles become connected with other entities through wireless communication. A connected vehicle extends the in-vehicle network to enable communicating with The International Standards Organization (ISO) standard on road vehicle safety [4] defines safety as the absence of potential for harm caused by failures or unintended behavior of system components. The ISO definition of safety excludes intended failures, caused by malicious intended behavior of potential attackers; that is, it excludes failures due to security threats (The potential for a threat-source to successfully exploit a particular information system vulnerability [5] .). This paper answers the following questions: 1) Should security threats be integrated with safety assurance for connected vehicles? 2) What are the challenges for extending safety assurance for connected vehicles to include security threats?
The paper attempts to answer both questions. First, we give an overview of AGORA, a framework for developing ITS applications. Then, we discuss in Section III the limitation of current safety assurance (justification that the safety measures address sufficiently the unintended failures of the system) for connected vehicle and we propose to extend safety assurance cases to include security aspects. Next, we discuss the challenges of integrating security aspects to provide extended safety assurance of connected vehicle in Section IV and we propose, in Section V, an approach for developing ITS applications that have extended safety assurances. Then, we conclude the paper with a short discussion about the impacts of extending safety assurance cases with security aspects. advertisements to vehicular and cellular nodes. AGORA framework includes an Integrated Development Environment (IDE), a Netbeans plug-in [8] , enabling composition of audio-visual ITS applications and a Software Development Kit (SDK) for developing more advanced applications. The framework includes a set of context aware and location-based ITS applications. Figure 3 shows a set of out-of-the-box ITS applications we developed using the framework, which are, currently, being tested.
Users use the IDE and SDK of AGORA to visually compose location and context-aware ITS applications based on "rules" of the form "IF conditions THEN actions," as illustrated in Figure 4 . The use of rule-based descriptions allows for easier and rapid development of ITS applications. Also, AGORA utilizes secure and well-tested code so that application developers are more productive.
Each ITS application is organized in two Extensible Markup Language (XML) files that specify the conditions and actions that model the behavior of the application. The rules are of three types:
• Business logic rules: These rules describe the core functionality of the application. Each of the rules is composed of an antecedent part, which returns references to the data items that fulfill the described conditions and consequent part, which executes actions that can communicate, assert or retract facts as needed.
• Mapping logic rules: These rules describe how and when to refresh the audio-visual and Braille-Code elements 1 that are associated with the application. There is provision to update these rules dynamically through TMC.
• Audio-visual and braille-code interface elements: This part of the application serves as the user interface. Applications can be built to have a variety of interfaces including Audio-only, Visual-only, Audio-Visual or Braille-Code interfaces. This part of the application is compiled separately and is linked to the business and mapping logic parts of the application using Java reflections technology [9] . AGORA provides a suite of safety, efficiency and comfort applications. Safety applications reduce traffic accidents, e.g. weather advisory and hazard alerts. Efficiency applications encompass intelligent traffic flow management and navigation and vehicle carbon footprint. Comfort applications include entertainment and infotainment applications, such as, gas prices and parking space finder.
While connected vehicles benefit from ITS applications, they have security threats that affect the safety of the vehicle. The following section justifies the need to extend safety assurance and consider intended failures; that is, failures that could be caused intentionally by potential attackers.
III. A CASE FOR EXTENDED SAFETY ASSURANCE IN CONNECTED VEHICLE
This section justifies the need to extend safety assurance for connected vehicles. It describes the current practices of safety assurance, provides an overview of security threats pertaining to connected vehicles, and argues that safety assurance should be extended to include security aspect.
A. Overview of safety assurance in connected vehicles
The ISO standard on road vehicle safety [4] defines safety as the absence of potential for physical injuries or harm (damage to the health of persons) caused by failure or unintended behavior of system components-with respect to their design intent-and judged to be unacceptable according to valid societal moral concepts. In other words, safety is about accidental harms, and how they are prevented, reduced, and properly reacted to [10] .
There are two aspects of safety for vehicles: vehicle safety and road safety. The goal of vehicle safety is to minimize the occurrence and consequences of automobile accidents. The goal of road safety is to reduce the risk for a person using the road (e.g., motorists) to be killed or seriously injured. 1 Braille-Code is a tactile writing system for blinds and visually impaired.
The common approach for assessing the safety of vehicles components is to analyze the hazards (unintentional failures) and to evaluate the risk mitigation mechanisms that address them. That is, identify and categorize hazardous events and identify safety measures for preventing or mitigating unreasonable risks. A safety measure is an activity or a technical solution for avoiding or controlling systematic failures, detecting or controlling random hardware or software failures, or mitigating their harmful impacts [4] .
Safety is evaluated through safety assurance cases [11] : "A documented body of evidences that provides convincing and valid arguments that a system is adequately safe for a given application in a given environment." It uses a "topdown," goal-based approach to justify that a system is safe, and arguments that the safety requirements for a system or a component are complete and satisfied by evidences (e.g., test results, procedures, etc.) collected from the safety activities. Assurance of the safety of a system (justification that a system is safe) uses a combination of the following [12] : 1) Demonstrate compliance to known safety standards, which are designed to ensure the safety of products, activities or processes, etc. 2) Argument the satisfaction of safety goals (i.e., top level safety requirements) of a system by dividing them into sub-goals-at progressively more detailed levelsand by justifying the satisfaction of the sub-goals using evidences. 3 3) Demonstrate known vulnerabilities are not a problem. Vulnerabilities (in this context) are weaknesses of the system that cause events that potentially harm people when exploited. Figure 5 shows a partial preliminary safety case for the braking system. 
B. Overview of security threats of connected vehicles
An attacker who aims to change the behavior of an unconnected vehicle needs to physically access to its devices or access to its communication bus. There is a common assumption by vehicle manufacturers that it is highly unlikely this attacker could acquire one of these capabilities [17] . An attacker, who has these capabilities, is better off-in terms of efforts and complexity-stealing the vehicle or installing spying equipment than changing the vehicle behavior. So, the in-vehicle network is assumed to be a closed network. The assumption is not valid anymore because vehicles become connected to other vehicles, to personal devices, and to Service Centers (SCs). Connected vehicles offer more capabilities to the attacker to compose complex attacks. Threats to connected vehicles include: disseminate bogus data to nearby vehicles, cheat in aggregating data, wormhole attack, tamper the device hardware, tamper the device software, Denial of Service (DoS) attack, unauthorized over the air update of devices, and masquerade attack [1] . For instance, an attacker could connect to the in-vehicle network of a target connected vehicle, inject messages in its in-vehicle network to lock its brake system, and make it crash with another vehicle or an obstacle.
In the last decade, several threat analysis, security solutions and security and privacy architectures have been proposed to assure secure communication in in-vehicle networks, in VANETs, between vehicles and personal devices, and between vehicles and service centers; detect malicious data; protect against wormhole attack; secure data aggregation for VANETs; protect Over-The-Air firmware updates; protect against DoS attack; and enforce access control to applications [1] . These solutions provide limited efficiency in mitigating malicious intended behavior-i.e., security attacks. For instance, Checkoway et al. [16] demonstrated a set of attacks on a connected vehicle that has e-call applicationthe car is a Sedan where 100.000 to 200.000 units are used in USA. Table I provides examples of remote attacks the authors demonstrated.
A common approach to assess potential attacks is to use attack trees [19] . Figure 6 shows a partial attack tree for an automatic brake function.
The common approach for investigating security aspects of connected vehicles is assessing the security risks posed by potential attackers, e.g., EVITA project [18] . Security risk combines the expectation (in terms of likelihood) of exercising threats and the severity of resulting impacts, which are of 4 categories: physical injuries (a safety impact), privacy compromise of individuals and vehicles, financial losses, and interruption of operations of the vehicle system. Addressing a set of specific attacks reduces the security risk of the connected vehicle but does not necessarily assure the 
C. Proposed extension to safety assurance
An attacker may stage simple attacks or complex attacks to compromise the safety of a component or feature of a connected vehicle. For instance, an attacker who communicates through cellular network with one connected vehicle, which is connected to two other vehicles may exploit vulnerabilities in the three vehicles and disable their brake systems.
The safety assurance case shown in Figure 5 does not consider risks caused by attacks that cause intentional failure: it assumes the brake system is safe, though an attacker could prevent it from working properly. A safety assurance case that justifies that a system or a component prevents harm could be false: It is possible to have potential physical injuries or damage to the health of persons caused by intended malicious behaviors, not necessarily failure or unintended behavior of system components [20] .
We address the limitation of safety assurance by proposing extended safety assurance. We define extended safety as: absence of potential for physical injuries or damage to the health of persons caused by unintended and intended behavior of system components and judged to be unacceptable in a certain context according to valid societal moral concepts. We define extended safety assurance case as: case that considers safety and security aspects related to assuring that the system does not potentially cause physical injuries or damage to the health of persons.
IV. CHALLENGES FOR EXTENDED SAFETY ASSURANCE IN CONNECTED VEHICLES
This section discusses three challenges related to developing extended safety cases for connected vehicles. Their description follows.
Challenge 1: How to model the interactions between safety and security aspects in extended safety assurance for connected vehicles?
Security threats and controls (mechanisms to mitigate the threats) may interact with safety hazards and measures, which contrasts the common practices of considering safety (in the sense of hazards causing harm) and security as two independents aspects, especially for motor vehicles. The interactions include [21] : 1) Causality: Security attack to a system could cause safety hazards (or the opposite). For example, malicious modification of data used by a component of the system could cause accidental failure of the system. 2) Conflict: Safety measures could be in conflict with security measures. For example, redundancy of a component is a safety measure that could conflict with a security measure, such as centralized access control. 3) Mutual enforcement: a security measure could support a safety measure (and the opposite). For example, a source code analysis could support both safety and security aspects-assuming the analysis includes logic and security inspections. Dobbing and Lautien [22] propose integrating safety and security aspects into dependability (The ability to deliver service that can be trusted.) assurance cases that apply for both safety and security certifications. The work does not consider the interactions between both aspects.
Safety assurance cases have a tree-like structure with several levels of goals, where each goal is addressed when its sub-goals are addressed and evidences need to justify the low-level goals. Integrating security aspects and safety aspects into extended safety assurance cases requires (1) considering security measures when evaluating the safety claims, and safety measures when evaluating the security claims; and (2) modeling the relationships between the security claims, security evidences, safety claims, and safety measures.
Moreover, extended safety assurance cases need to consider that the causality relationship of security threats is best modeled using attack graphs [23] because most security attacks result from sequentially exploiting system vulnerabilities (a weakness of a flaw that allows attackers to attack the system) leading to break into the system [23] .
Challenge 2: How to manage extended safety assurance case evolution considering to changes to the connected vehicle?
The hardware and software components of connected vehicles change over time. For example, the vehicle owner may decide to connect a new device to the vehicle, e.g., an entertainment device that connects to the in-vehicle network of the vehicle; the vehicle owner decides to install a new ITS application on an existing device; and the vehicle manufacturer recommends a firmware update of one of the devices. The changes affect the system architecture of connected vehicles, which evolves over time.
The security threats and hazards that apply to a system architecture of a connected vehicle change when the architecture changes. The fitness of security and safety measures may change also when the architecture changes. For example, connecting a new entrainment device to the in-vehicle network adds new threats and hazards, e.g., the device firmware may include a malware code that could inject arbitrary messages to the in-vehicle network. However, it is not possible to assess the extended safety of a connected vehicle (from scratch again) each time the system architecture of the vehicle changes. We need methods for reassurance of extended safety cases that minimize the assessment work.
Challenge 3: How to develop ITS applications for connected vehicles assured for extended safety?
Several ITS applications are designed to improve the safety of vehicles, such as Cooperative Adaptive Cruise Control (CACC) application [24] . The application exchanges messages with the neighboring vehicles, computes the safe distances between the vehicle and its predecessors, and sends appropriate messages to the ECUs of the vehicle-through the in-vehicle network-to adjust its speed accordingly.
Currently, it is wrongly assumed that the use of an ITS application does not potentially cause injuries or damage. In fact, unintentional faults or malicious attacks could cause a safety application to cause harm to the vehicle riders. For example, a failing CACC application 5 could send inappropriate messages to the ECUs of the vehicle-e.g., increase the speed of the vehicle instead of reducing it-which may cause the vehicle to crash. The same applies to smart cruise control applications, which enhance vehicle safety, but expose car drivers to danger when exploited by attackers-e.g., through injecting deceptive data.
V. PROPOSED APPROACH FOR DEVELOPING ITS APPLICATIONS WITH EXTENDED SAFETY
The common approach for verifying applications for ITS is to develop the application, extract its model and verify it. This approach assumes that the model is faithful to the complexity of the software it abstracts, which may not be true. In our work, we adopt the view of developing an easy to understand rule-based model of the application, verify its safety and security specifications, and instantiate it while preserving the specifications (We believe that model driven development assures better quality properties such as security-see also [25] .) Figure 7 shows the high level process that we plan to use to develop ITS applications (for connected vehicles) and assure their extended safety cases. The process uses (1) a rule-based model driven development to compose ITS applications from 5 The cause of the failure could be intentional attack or accidental fault. components whose extended safety is assured, and (2) a topdown approach for building extended safety cases; where the main extended safety claims are decomposed into safety and security claims. The claims are argued using evidences.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The drawback of connecting the in-vehicle network to external entities is the presence of security threats that may affect the safety of the vehicles. We conclude that safety hazards and security threats are not independent in connected vehicles and connecting the in-vehicle network to external entities requires extending safety assurance cases to consider security threats. We find that integrating safety and security aspects into extended safety assurance cases induces a set of challenges related to the interactions between them, the evolution of the safety assurance cases and the assurance of ITS applications.
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